USAA v. PNC Bank and the Definition of the Abstract Idea
Written by Ben Esplin
On January 14, 2026, United Services Automobile Association (USAA) filed a Petition for Certiorari in USAA v. PNC Bank, N.A. (Docket No. 25-853). While the Supreme Court signaled potential interest on January 29 by requesting a response from PNC, history suggests a cautious interpretation of this move. For over a decade, the Court has consistently declined to clarify the 35 U.S.C. § 101 "abstract idea" exception, and the most likely outcome for this petition remains a denial. However, the case is notable for how it highlights the ongoing difficulty in distinguishing between a patent-eligible process and an ineligible abstract concept.
The Federal Circuit vacated jury verdicts totaling over $200 million by determining that USAA’s claims were directed to the "abstract idea of depositing a check using a handheld mobile device." This characterization brings to the forefront a fundamental tension in patent law regarding the role of physical objects. The concept at issue—depositing a check with a phone—necessarily involves at least two tangible objects: a physical check and a handheld mobile device. When a court classifies the interaction between these tangible items as "abstract," it raises a significant question regarding the definition of an abstract idea versus a non-abstract one.
Since every idea is, by its very nature, abstract, the current legal framework requires a distinction that is difficult to articulate. The "idea" of any invention, from a mechanical gear to a chemical compound, begins as an abstraction. Patent eligibility has historically depended on the application of an idea to produce a useful, concrete result. In this case, the Federal Circuit reached its conclusion by focusing on whether the invention improved the functionality of the computer itself, rather than the industrial or commercial process the computer was being used to perform.
USAA’s petition argues that this "computer functionality" requirement has been applied too broadly, effectively excluding innovations that use technology to transform physical processes. The Supreme Court’s request for a response from PNC indicates that at least some members of the Court may wish to examine this issue, but we have seen similar interest in previous cases end in a denial of certiorari. If the Court does not take this case, the legal landscape will remain one where the presence of tangible hardware does not necessarily protect an invention from being labeled an abstract idea. For now, the safest course for practitioners remains a focus on the specific technical implementation of an idea, as the boundary between the abstract and the tangible.